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H ARDLY MORE than four months before Black Monday, Oc-
.tober 19, 1987, the United States Supreme Court gave the
securities industry great leverage in choosing the forum for
resolving disputes with their customers by recognizing arbitration
as a contractual alternative to litigation.1 The American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA) reports that requests for arbitration of
public securities disputes through its auspices alone have risen by
fifty percent since Black Monday.2 The current heavy volume of
* Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, A.B. Bryn Mawr College,
Ph.D. University of Toronto, J.D. University of Chicago.
** Carella, Byrne, Bain & Gilfillian, A.B. St. John's University, Minnesota,
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thank Neil B. Cohen, Robert E. Meade and Robert A. Love.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
2. Statistics provided by AAA Department of Case Administration, 140 W.
51 St., N.Y., N.Y. 10020; see also Schiffers & Goldwasser, When Your Broker Fouls
Up, CHANGING TIMES, Jan. 1988, at 65-66 (identified main areas of complaint
(25)
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arbitration in the AAA and other arbitral systems provided by the
national securities exchanges and registered securities associa-
tions will provide the first large-scale test of how arbitration is
being received by the investing public. If arbitration is perceived
as fair, it will enhance the investor's confidence in the securities
markets. Furthermore, it will provide some docket relief for fed-
eral district courts already deemed to be overburdened with se-
curities cases. As long ago as 1975, the Court had acted to reduce
standing in securities cases through the buyer-seller require-
ment.3 At the same time, Congress had acted to enlarge the
power of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over ar-
bitration. 4 The philosophy embodied in both of those actions
played a role in permitting the Court to embrace arbitration of
public securities disputes in 1987.
Thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court viewed both arbi-
tration and the nature of securities suits very differently. It held
in Wilko v. Swan 5 that claims arising under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act or Securities Act) were not arbi-
trable and that a district court could not compel arbitration in
accord with a preexisting arbitration agreement. 6 Since that deci-
arising from Black Monday as follows: unsuitable investments, broker's unavail-
ability, execution of trades at unauthorized prices and margin calls).
3. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The
Court adopted the so-called Birnbaum rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), and held that the im-
plied private right of action under rule 10b-5 was limited to actual "purchasers"
or "sellers" of securities. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730-31. However, the
Court rejected the exception to the Birnbaum rule created by the court of appeals
which granted a private right of action under rule lOb-5 to an offeree of an
offering of securities made pursuant to an antitrust decree. Id. at 749-50. The
Court's holding marked a reaffirmation of "virtually all lower federal courts fac-
ing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question .... "
Id. at 731 (citing, inter alia, Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir.
1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974); Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311 (2d Cir. 1972); Sim-
mons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
(1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 227-28 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970)).
4. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat.
97, 146-54 (1975) (amending Section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1982))).
5. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
6. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). Section 12(2)
provides:
Any person who ...
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the pro-
visions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsec-
tion (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
[Vol. 34: p. 25
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sion, numerous lower courts 7 have extended the Wilko doctrine to
bar arbitration of rule 10b-5 claims under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19348 (1934 Act or Exchange Act),
holding that public policy concerns and legislative history compel
resolution in a judicial forum and that the similarities of the 1933
and 1934 Acts outweigh any differences. 9 On June 8, 1987, the
Court rejected the lower courts' extension of Wilko, holding in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 10 that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act of 1925 (FAA) requires the enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements with respect to section 10(b) claims.I'
The objective of this article is to examine the need for rigor-
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such secur-
ity, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id.
7. See, e.g, Surman v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d
59 (8th Cir. 1984); Sawyer v. Raymond James & Assocs., 642 F.2d 791, 792 (5th
Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979);
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir.
1978).
8. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
For the text of section 10(b), see infra note 58. For rule 10b-5, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1988).
9. Malcolm and Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L. REV. 725, 754
n. 176 (1986). For a thorough discussion of the public policy concerns, legisla-
tive history and similarities and differences in the provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts that arguably would have supported the extension of the Wilko doc-
trine to rule lOb-5 claims, see id. at 747-61.
10. 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343 (1987).
11. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). Section 3 of the FAA provides in perti-
nent part that:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agree-
ment in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is
pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement....
9 U.S.C. § 3.
1989]
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ous SEC oversight of brokers' self-regulatory procedures and
modification of present arbitration procedures.
I. THE ARBITRABILITY OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION
ARISING UNDER SECTION 10(b) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT
Anglo-American jurisprudence had traditionally manifested a
jealousy for the jurisdiction of courts and a repugnance for en-
forcing arbitration agreements in the belief that arbitration
ousted courts from their jurisdiction.' 2 Furthermore, the fear
that an arbitrator could not offer the full range of remedies of a
court made judges unwilling to require a party to submit his con-
troversy to an inadequate tribunal.' 3 Nevertheless, by 1925, a
slight change in attitude allowed Congress to enact the FAA
which was designed to overcome the tradition of hostility and to
declare arbitration agreements enforceable.14 In so acting, Con-
gress acknowledged the acute congestion in the federal courts
and devised a method of promoting arbitration as a quick and
inexpensive alternative to litigation. To encourage arbitration as
an alternative means of dispute resolution, the FAA places arbi-
tration agreements on the same footing as other contracts. Sec-
tion 2 of the FAA directs courts to enforce arbitration agreements
except when legal or equitable grounds exist for the revocation of
any contract.' 5 Section 3 provides for a stay ofjudicial proceed-
12. Malcolm and Segall, supra note 9, at 728-29.
13. Comment, Arbitrability of Implied Rights of Action Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 506, 511 n.32 (1986).
14. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26. The equitable and
legal grounds upon which a court can refuse to enforce an arbitration award,
some of which are mentioned in the text accompanying footnote 18, are detailed
in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. Section 10 provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or un-
due means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbi-
trators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
[Vol. 34: p. 25
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ings on any issue referable to arbitration pending that arbitra-
tion.1 6 Section 4 permits a party to an arbitration agreement to
petition for an order compelling arbitration pursuant to the terms
of that agreement. 17
Arbitration awards must be confirmed by the courts unless
exceptional circumstances are present that would justify modifica-
tion or correction.1 8 These circumstances include fraud, gross
misconduct by the arbitrator and the granting of awards which
exceed the arbitrator's authority.' 9 The FAA represents a
"strong national policy favoring the recognition of arbitration
agreements as means of resolving private conflicts short of the
more costly and disruptive avenue of litigation." 20 In furtherance
of this national policy, courts construe arbitration clauses to per-
mit arbitration of the issue presented for adjudication whenever
possible. 2' Any doubts concerning the arbitrability of an issue,
including doubts about the construction of a statute, must, as a
matter of federal law, be resolved in favor of arbitration. 22
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
Section 11 provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order modifying
or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitra-
tion-
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures
or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing,
or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not sub-
mitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the deci-
sion upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting
the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the
intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.
Id. § 11. For a discussion of the grounds recommended by the Securities Indus-
try Conference on Arbitration for vacating an arbitration award, see infra notes
173-76 and accompanying text.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). For the text of section 3, see supra note 11.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
18. Id. § 9.
19. Id. §§ 10-11. For a discussion of the grounds recommended by the Se-
curities Industry Conference on Arbitration for vacating an arbitration award,
see infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
20. Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 397-98 (1987) (quoting Weissbuch v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 1977)).
21. Id.
22. Id.; see, e.g., Southwest Indus. Import & Export, Inc. v. Wilmod Co., 524
1989]
5
McCauliff and Tyms: New Protections in Arbitrating Public Securities Disputes in the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Eight years after it passed the FAA, Congress enacted the Se-
curities Act of 1933.23 The 1933 Act, which was designed to pro-
tect the investing public from fraud, created a regulatory scheme
to govern the behavior of issuers, underwriters, dealers and bro-
kers engaged in the sale of new or recently issued securities. The
1933 Act requires the seller to file a registration statement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission 24 and to make full and
complete disclosure of all material facts surrounding the offer-
ing.25 Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides a remedy for mis-
statements or half-truths in connection with the sale or offer for
sale of a security in interstate commerce. 26 This remedy takes the
form of an express civil right of action against a broker or dealer,
enforceable by the purchaser who claims to have been
defrauded. 27
Remedial rather than penal in nature, the 1933 Act provides
compensation only for losses actually incurred; thus, there are no
provisions for treble or punitive damages. 28 Section 12(2) of the
1933 Act established three significant modifications to common
law actions for fraud and misrepresentation: it created an express
statutory cause of action; it shifted the burden of proving (non-)
negligence to the defendant, thus eliminating the requirement of
scienter; and it gave the plaintiff the right to proceed in either
state or federal court to enforce the cause of action, 29 thus effec-
tively barring the defendant from removing the action to federal
court. 30 Moreover, to ensure the customer of his statutory rights,
section 14 of the 1933 Act voids any attempt to circumvent or
waive any of its provisions. 3' In determining the arbitrability of
F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1975) (courts should give full effect to arbitration clauses
to ease court congestion and to effectuate intent of parties); Gait v. Libbey-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967) (arbitration clauses
should be construed whenever possible in favor of arbitration); Lundgren v.
Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 110 (9th Cir. 1962) (same).
23. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1982)).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
25. Id. § 771(2).
26. Id. For the text of section 12(2), see supra note 6.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953). For
the text of section 12(2), see supra note 6.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1982). Section 1 l(g) of the 1933 Act provides: "In
no case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed the price at
which the security was offered to the public." Id.
29. Comment, The Case for Domestic Arbitration of Federal Securities Claims: Is the
Wilko Doctrine Still Valid? 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 619, 623-24 & n.32 (1986).
30. Id. at 624.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). Section 14 of the 1933 Act provides: "Any
[Vol. 34: p. 25
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claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, courts have been compelled to resolve
conflicts between important federal policies underlying those two
Acts and the FAA. 32
A. The Early Balance Between the Policies of the Securities Acts and
the Federal Arbitration Act
In Wilko v. Swan, a question was raised about the meaning of
section 14's "nonwaiver" provisions. The Wilko Court deter-
mined that the question was whether an agreement to arbitrate a
future controversy is a "condition, stipulation or provision bind-
ing any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision" of the Securities Act which section 14 declares
void.33 In 1951, plaintiff Wilko purchased 1,600 shares of com-
mon stock of Air Associates, Inc., for a price of nearly $30,000.
In his complaint, Wilko alleged that he was induced to make the
purchase by false representations that pursuant to a merger con-
tract with the Borg Warner Corporation, Air Associates' stock
would be valued at six dollars per share over the current market
price, and that financial interests were buying up the stock for
speculative profit. Wilko alleged that he was not informed that
the Air Associates stock he had purchased had been sold by a di-
rector of, and counsel for, Air Associates, Inc., who was also deal-
ing through the same broker. Two weeks after the purchase,
Wilko sold his stock at a loss, and he claimed that amount in dam-
ages. The respondent brokerage firm moved to stay the trial of
the action pursuant to section 3 of the FAA. The relevant clause
of the predispute margin agreement provided that "[a]ny contro-
versy arising between us under this contract shall be determined
by arbitration . . . ."4 The district court denied the motion on
the basis that the arbitration agreement deprived the plaintiff of
the court remedy afforded by the 1933 Act and was thus unen-
forceable. 35 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed. 36 The divided court concluded that the 1933
Act did not prohibit arbitration of future controversies and found
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regu-
lations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
32. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 9, at 754-55.
33. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
34. Id. at 428-29, 432 n. 15.
35. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
36. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
1989]
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that the congressional policy favoring arbitration preempted the
choice of forum provision of the 1933 Act.3 7
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by
invalidating agreements for arbitration of issues arising under the
1933 Act.38 The Court reasoned that when a securities buyer,
prior to any violation, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up
more than a participant in other business transactions. The inves-
tor surrenders one of the advantages the Securities Act gives
him-a wider choice of courts and venue-and surrenders it
before the dispute arises, at a time when he is less able to judge
the role which the substantive securities law would play in his par-
ticular case.3 9 The effectiveness of these "pro-buyer" provisions
is lessened in arbitration, especially if the buyer's case turns on
the arbitrator's subjective findings regarding the alleged viola-
tor's purpose and knowledge of the 1933 Act because arbitrators
decide without benefit ofjudicial instruction on the law. 40 Again,
because their award may be made without explanation of their
reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings, the
arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory re-
quirements as "burden of proof," "reasonable care" or "material
fact" cannot be examined.4' Power to vacate an award is lim-
ited. 42 In unrestricted submissions such as the 1950's margin
agreements envisaged, the interpretations of the law by the arbi-
trators, in contrast to manifest disregard for the provisions of the
Securities Act, are not subject to judicial review for error in inter-
pretation. 43 The Court acknowledged that while on one hand
Congress had afforded the advantages of arbitration to partici-
pants in transactions subject to its legislative power, on the other
hand Congress had provided the Securities Act to protect the
rights of investors and had forbidden a waiver of any of those
rights.44
Accordingly, the Wilko Court held that a brokerage firm may
not bind a customer to arbitration to the exclusion of his private
37. Id. at 444-45.
38. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
39. Id. at 435.
40. Id. at 435-36.
41. Id. at 436.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 436-37.
44. Id. at 438.
[Vol. 34: p. 25
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss1/2
ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES
remedies under section 12(2) of the Securities Act.45 The Wilko
doctrine does not prohibit arbitration agreements; it declares
them unenforceable when interposed as a defense to a suit under
the 1933 Act. 46 The Court thus created an exception to the pro-
visions of the FAA.
Following the Wilko decision, some lower courts extended its
reach to bar arbitration of claims brought under the 1934 Act. 47
These courts held that Wilko guaranteed investors the right to liti-
gate rule lOb-5 claims in federal courts, notwithstanding other-
wise enforceable arbitration agreements. 48 In extending Wilko's
reach to investor claims alleging violations of rule lOb-5, the
courts reasoned that the non-waiver provisions of the 1934 Act
protected the implied right of action against the effect of an arbi-
tration agreement, as much as if Congress had granted the right
textually. Thus, these courts found arbitration of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 claims unenforceable. 49
Congress may have tacitly approved this judicial interpreta-
tion of its intent when it enacted substantial amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act in 1975.50 Although the 1975 amend-
ments did not specifically address the enforceability of predispute
arbitration agreements between the securities industry and its
public customers, a conference committee report clearly stated
that Congress believed Wilko applied to the 1934 Act and prohib-
ited enforcement of arbitration agreements on section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 claims. 5' The clear understanding of the conferees
was that this amendment did not change existing law, as articu-
lated in Wilko, concerning the effect of arbitration proceeding
provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing with
members and participants of self-regulatory organizations. 52
There are similarities in the rights created by the Securities
45. Id.
46. Katsoris, The Arbitration of Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
279, 295 (1984).
47. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 407-08.
48. Id. at 407 n.104.
49. Note, Enforcing Arbitration of Federal Securities Law Claims: The Effect of
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335, 342 (1987).
For cases extending the Wilko refusal to enforce arbitration agreements to rule
lOb-5 claims, see supra note 7.
50. Lindsay, "Public" Rights and Private Forums. Predispute Arbitration Agree-
ments and Securities Litigation, 20 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 643, 673 (1987).
51. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. III, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 321, 342.
52. Id.
19891
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Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The causes
of action available, however, under section 12(c) of the Securities
Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are significantly differ-
ent.53 A "right" refers to a set of obligations or duties requiring
others to act, or to refrain from acting, in a certain way toward the
individual who holds the right. 54 A "cause of action" on the other
hand, contains the elements required to entitle that individual to
some form of relief, usually from the courts, for a violation of his
right.55 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 represents an ex-
pansion of the federal regulation of securities begun in the Secur-
ities Act of 1933. The 1933 Act was directed at the conduct of
dealers, underwriters and issuers involved in the initial offering. 56
The 1934 Act regulates actions in the marketplace where these
issues are subsequently traded. 57 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
makes it unlawful for a seller of a security traded on a national
securities exchange to engage in any fraudulent, manipulative or
deceitful practice, to make an untrue statement of material fact, or
to fail to state a material fact necessary to make a statement not
misleading in the sale of any security.58 The two Acts have been
construed to be in pari materia and to be read as one wherever
possible.59 Both prohibit any waiver of their provisions. 60 Sec-
tion 12(2) and rule lOb-5 both create rights for investors by
prohibiting various forms of conduct and obligating brokers to
adhere to the restrictions of these Acts.
A distinction, however, should be noted in the objectives of
the respective Acts. "The 1933 Act was directed first and fore-
most at the protection of the investing public." 6' "While the
53. Comment, supra note 13, at 516.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Comment, supra note 29, at 625.
57. Id.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 780)(6) (1982). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
59. Comment, supra note 29, at 625 & n.42.
60. Id. at 626.
61. Id. at 625.
[Vol. 34: p. 25
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1934 Act is also intended to protect the public, its primary focus
is on the creation and maintenance of an efficient and orderly
capital market." 62 The introductory comments to the 1934 Act
contained in the Senate Report indicate congressional fear that
capital, needed by the depression era economy, would be driven
offshore unless action was taken to stabilize the securities mar-
kets. 63 The apprehension over the loss of domestic capital pro-
vided impetus for the 1934 Act. 64
There are, in addition, significant differences in the statutory
language of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the
1934 Act. 65 Section 12(2) entitles the investor to an express stat-
utory cause of action. Neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 pro-
vides for an express statutory cause of action. Section 10(b)
simply makes the prohibited conduct unlawful. As a result, courts
have implied a private cause of action for a purchaser who alleg-
edly has been injured by a violation of section 10(b) provisions. 66
The existence of an implied private right of action under rule
10b-5 has been declared to "be beyond peradventure." 67
The Acts also differ in their jurisdictional provisions. Section
22 of the 1933 Act provides for the concurrent jurisdiction of
both state and federal courts. 68 Section 27 of the 1934 Act, how-
ever, reposes exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. 69 As a
result, a plaintiff seeking relief under the provisions of the 1934
Act has a more restricted choice of forum and venue than a 1933
Act plaintiff.
Moreover, under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, the seller is
forced to assume the burden of proving lack of scienter. 70 This
shift in the allocation of the burden of proof from the require-
ments of the common law action of deceit manifested Congress'
intention to extend special protection to the investor who as-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 625-26.
64. Id. at 626.
65. Id. For the text of section 12(2), see supra note 6. For the text of sec-
tion 10(b), see supra note 58.
66. Id. For cases recognizing an implied private right of action under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see infra note 91.
67. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982).
69. Id. § 78aa.
70. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 9, at 731; see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess., 9-10 (1933) ("[T]he burden of disproving responsibility for reprehen-
sible acts of omission or commission [is] on those who purport to issue state-
ments for the public's reliance."); see also Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431 (1953) ("seller is
made to assume the burden of proving lack of scienter").
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serted a claim under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. The 1934 Act,
however, places the burden of proving scienter on the plaintiff.7 '
The majority of federal courts, perceiving that the similarities
in the two Acts outweighed the differences, proceeded to recog-
nize a private cause of action under rule 10b-5. 72 For many years
the Supreme Court also tacitly recognized the circuit courts' ex-
tension of Wilko to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. By re-
peatedly denying certiorari in lower court cases that extended
Wilko to the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court in effect allowed lower
federal courts to develop a substantial body of case law which pre-
vented enforcement of arbitration agreements in claims brought
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 73 Thus, for two decades,
Wilko remained persuasive.
B. The Shift in the Judicial Balance Between the Policies of the
Securities Acts and the Federal Arbitration Act
A change in the Supreme Court's point of view developed
slowly during the 1970's and 1980's. The first sign that Wilko was
losing its force came when the Supreme Court addressed the con-
flict between the implied right of action and the enforceability of
arbitration agreements in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.74 In Scherk, a
contract, which had been signed in Vienna, provided for the
transfer of the ownership of a German company from Scherk to
Alberto-Culver, along with all rights held by the company to
trademarks in cosmetic goods. The contract expressly guaran-
teed the sole and unencumbered ownership of the trademarks.
The contract also contained an arbitration clause providing that
any controversy or claim arising out of the agreement or breach
thereof would be referred to arbitration before the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris and that the laws of the state of
Illinois would apply to any future disputes.
One year after the closing, Alberto-Culver discovered that
the purchased trademark rights were substantially encumbered,
and it therefore sought to rescind the contract. Scherk refused,
and Alberto-Culver brought suit in the federal district court in
71. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976) (plaintiff's proof
of scienter is a prerequisite to action under rule 1Ob-5); Comment, supra note 29,
at 626-27.
72. Note, supra note 49, at 341. For cases recognizing an implied private
right of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see infra note 91.
73. Id. at 342. For cases refusing to enforce agreements to arbitrate claims
brought under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see supra note 7.
74. 417 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1974).
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Illinois arguing that Scherk's fraudulent representations concern-
ing the status of the trademark rights constituted violations of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule
lOb-5.
While not explicitly holding Wilko inapplicable to rule lOb-5
claims, the Supreme Court ruled that the predispute arbitration
agreement was enforceable because of the crucial differences be-
tween the relationship of the parties in Wilko and Scherk. 75 The
Court found that in Wilko the arbitration agreement was between
a customer and a broker. The contract to purchase the business
entities belonging to Scherk, however, was truly an international
agreement. 76 If the arbitration agreement, which provided in ad-
vance for a specific forum for resolving disputes, had not been
enforced, the parties would have been faced with many uncertain-
ties because of the various conflict of laws rules that might be
applied.77
The Court suggested in dictum that the Wilko opinion was
not controlling in a case brought under section 10(b) or rule lOb-
5, because section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides "a defrauded
purchaser with a 'special right' of private remedy for civil liability
... [whereas t]here is no statutory counterpart of § 12(2) in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and neither [section] 10(b) of
that Act nor Rule lOb-5 speaks of a private remedy to redress
violations of the kind alleged here." 78 The Court observed that
while federal case law had established that section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 create an implied private cause of action, the 1934 Act itself
does not establish the special right that the Court in Wilko found
significant. 79
Once Scherk raised questions about Wilko, other doubts arose.
Because section 29 of the 1934 Act contains a nonwaiver provi-
sion similar to section 14 of the 1933 Act,80 lower courts ex-
tended Wilko to rule lOb-5 claims arising under the 1934 Act. 8'
75. Id. at 515-16.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 516.
78. Id. at 513.
79. Id. at 513-14. It has been argued that the Court's reasoning regarding
that distinction was a basis for the holding, not obiter dictum: "Notwithstanding
the Court's statement that the international aspect of the case was crucial, this
statement of the Court's holding makes clear that the Court also relied on the
distinction it found between implied causes of actions under the 1934 Act."
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 411.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982); see also Fletcher, supra note 20, at 403.
81. For a discussion of the extension of Wilko to rule lOb-5 claims, see supra
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Should the general nonwaiver provision of the 1934 Act override
the FAA in the same way as section 14 of the 1933 Act does when
the 1934 Act's nonwaiver provision is unsupported by special
rights and broad jurisdictional provisions similar to those found
in sections 12 and 22 of the 1933 Act? 82
Justice White forcefully expressed reservations in his concur-
ring opinion in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd.83 In Byrd, Justice
White shifted from his dissenting position in Scherk 8 4 in which he
had acknowledged Wilko as controlling and section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act of 1934 as rendering arbitration clauses void with-
out exception for fraudulent dealings which incidentally have
some international features. In his concurrence in Byrd, Justice
White addressed the question of the enforceability of arbitration
clauses as they apply to implied actions under the 1934 Act.85 He
noted that the premise of the controversy before the Court was
that Byrd's 1934 Act claims were not arbitrable. 86 He wrote:
"Nonetheless, I note that this is a matter of substantial doubt." 87
Justice White recalled that the Wilko Court in holding arbitration
notes 47-49 and accompanying text. For cases taking this approach, see supra
note 7.
82. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 300-01.
83. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). Byrd invested $160,000 through Dean Witter in
1981, and within eight months the value of his account had declined by more
than $100,000. Byrd brought suit in federal district court, alleging violations of
sections 10(b), 15(c) and 20 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and of various
state law provisions. He claimed that a Dean Witter agent had traded in his
account excessively and without his consent, had misrepresented the status of
his account and had done so with the knowledge, participation and ratification of
Dean Witter. When he invested with Dean Witter, however, Byrd signed an
agreement that contained a standard provision mandating arbitration of any fu-
ture controversy arising out of the contract. Thus, the issue was "whether, when
a complaint raises both federal securities claims and pendent state claims, a Fed-
eral District Court may deny a motion to compel arbitration of the state-law
claims despite the parties' agreement to arbitrate their disputes." Id. at 214.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that state claims must be sev-
ered from federal claims and upon a motion to compel arbitration, arbitration of
those state claims must be ordered according to the terms of the parties' agree-
ment. Id. at 217. The Court rejected the "doctrine of intertwining," which
would permit a district court, where factually and legally intertwined arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims arose out of the same transaction, to deny arbitration
as to the arbitrable claims and try all the claims together in federal court. Id. at
216-17. The Court acknowledged the inefficiency of the separate proceedings in
different forums which its holding required, but reasoned that the primary pol-
icy of the FAA was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements
to arbitrate and not to avoid "piecemeal" litigation. Id. at 221.
84. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 531-34 (1974).
85. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
86. Id. (White, J., concurring).
87. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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agreements unenforceable for claims under section 12(2) of the
1933 Act relied on three interconnected statutory provisions:
section 14 of the Act which voids waivers; section 12(2) which cre-
ates a special right to recover for misrepresentation not available
at common law; and section 22 which provides a plaintiff with a
broad selection of possible forums and provides for nation-wide
service of process.88
Justice White argued that Wilko's reasoning cannot be
mechanically transplanted to the 1934 Act.89 Although section 29
of that Act has an equivalent in section 14 of the 1933 Act, coun-
terparts of the other two provisions are imperfect or absent alto-
gether. Jurisdiction under the 1934 Act is narrower, being
restricted to federal courts.90 More important, the cause of action
under section l0b and rule lOb-5 is implied rather than express,
having been judicially created. 91 Accordingly, Justice White rea-
soned that the phrase from the antiwaiver section of the 1934 Act,
"waive compliance with any provision of this chapter," is literally
inapplicable. 92 Moreover, Wilko's solicitude for the special right
to bring a private cause of action established by Congress in the
1933 Act "is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action
is judicially implied and not so different from the common-law
action." 93 Justice White concluded by remarking that he raised
these reservations to emphasize that "the question remains open,
and the contrary holdings of the lower courts must be viewed with
some doubt."9 4
This was the situation when McMahon came before the Court.
The Court had already ruled that international disputes were ar-
88. Id. (White, J., concurring).
89. Id. (White, J., concurring).
90. Id. (White, J., concurring). For a discussion of the scope of jurisdiction
under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, see supra notes 68 & 69 and accompanying
text.
91. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring). Although neither section 10(b) nor
rule lOb-5 explicitly provides for any civil liabilities, it is well established in fed-
eral case law that by making the conduct unlawful, section 10(b) impliedly cre-
ates a civil remedy. See, e.g, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
380 (1983) (implied private right of action under rule lOb-5 is "beyond perad-
venture"); Kardon v. National Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
(implied private right of action under rule lOb-5); cf.J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964) (implied right of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934). For a discussion of the existence of an implied private
right of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see supra notes 66-67 & 72
and accompanying text.
92. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
93. Id. (White, J., concurring).
94. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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bitrable, and that state-law securities matters could be arbitrated
even though they were intertwined with federal securities claims.
II. COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION OF EXCHANGE ACT CLAIMS
Between 1960 and 1980, the number of annual filings in fed-
eral courts doubled. 95 Recently, federal filings involving the pub-
lic and members of the securities industry amounted to more than
3,000 civil actions for a one-year period.96 Between 1980 and
1987, the annual filings of arbitration claims at the New York
Stock Exchange almost tripled, increasing from 367 to 1,050,
while at the National Association of Securities Dealers, claims es-
calated from 318 to 2,886, including 789 claims not sent to re-
spondents due to operational, volume and other problems. 97
Without arbitration, many of these disputes might have found
their way onto federal court dockets. During the 1970's, the need
for speedy, inexpensive resolution of disputes had already
emerged as an important factor in assessing the quality of the jus-
tice delivery system. 98 Judicial attitudes had changed markedly
from the notion that arbitration privatized justice99 to the admin-
istrative consideration that the justice system sorely needed the
docket relief which greater reliance on arbitration could
provide.100
The desire of a brokerage house customer for a federal fo-
rum, perhaps even ajury trial, became submerged in the search to
relieve the overburdened docket, which was thought to threaten
the entire justice system.' 0 ' The newly prevailing image was that
of a court system in crisis. The old Wilko issue was transformed in
the McMahon case. In the balance, concerns about the quality and
effectiveness of arbitration did not ultimately appear significant,
95. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4, 37 (1983).
96. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 279 n.5.
97. Franklin, Rewriting the Rules-Securities Arbitration: Claims Up; Procedures
Proposed, 199 N.Y.LJ., Jan. 28, 1988, at 5.
98. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D.
83, 90-94 (1976).
99. W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal. 665, 667, 214 P. 38, 39 (1923)
(agreement between parties to contract to arbitrate all disputes arising thereaf-
ter invalid and unenforceable as attempt to oust courts ofjurisdiction and create
private tribunals).
100. See generally R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
(1985).
101. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984).
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especially in light of the expanded jurisdiction the SEC has en-
joyed over securities arbitration procedures since 1975.102 The
SEC's increased authority enabled it to deal more effectively with
defects in the various arbitration procedures.
In that sense, McMahon is a momentous decision, stamping
the Supreme Court's imprimatur on predispute selection of arbi-
tration. Potentially, this is a development no less significant than
the growth of equity in sixteenth-century England, faced with the
paralysis of a common law choked by the legislative prohibition
against devising new writs. Indeed, over the last decade, com-
mentators have already been heralding the competition which in-
creased use of arbitration will bring to the courts, thus enhancing
the utilitarian features of the entire justice delivery system. I03 Es-
pecially in the use of substantive law, competition between arbi-
tration and conventional litigation may give rise to new solutions
in settling disputes. 10 4
In McMahon, the Supreme Court ruled that Wilko does not
extend to the 1934 Act, and, therefore, that such claims are arbi-
trable if a valid arbitration agreement exists between the par-
ties. 10 5 The Court in this respect answered the question that
Justice White referred to as "open" in Byrd.10 6 The McMahon
Court did not expressly overrule Wilko. 10 7 The Court assumed,
arguendo, that Wilko was decided correctly and that claims arising
under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act cannot be compelled to
arbitration. 108
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the McMahon
Court analyzed the requirements of the FAA and the expansive
interpretation of that Act required by subsequent judicial deci-
sions. 10 9 The Court concluded that the FAA creates a presump-
tion that private contracts to arbitrate disputes are enforceable."l 0
In order to overcome the presumption of arbitrability of its claim,
102. For a discussion of the increased power of the SEC over the arbitra-
tion procedures of self-regulatory organizations, see infra note 143 and accom-
panying text.
103. See generally R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 174-79 (1981).
104. Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1987).
105. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
106. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
107. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2337.
110. Id.; see Note, Arbitration of Securities Claims: Wilko's Swan Song, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 203, 219 (1987).
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the movant must "demonstrate that Congress intended to make
an exception to the FAA for claims arising under ... the Ex-
change Act, an intention discernible from the text history, or pur-
poses of the Statute."111
In 1984, Eugene and Julia McMahon filed an amended com-
plaint against Shearson/American Express Inc. (Shearson), a bro-
kerage firm with whom they had accounts, and Mary Ann
McNulty, Shearson's registered representative. The complaint al-
leged that McNulty, with Shearson's knowledge, had violated sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 by engaging in
fraudulent, excessive trading by churning the McMahons' ac-
counts and by making false statements and omitting material facts
from her advice. The complaint also alleged a RICO claim and
state law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties. Shear-
son moved to compel arbitration of the McMahons' claims in ac-
cord with the arbitration clause in the customer agreements the
McMahons signed before the dispute. The district court ordered
arbitration of all claims except the RICO claim." 2 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the nonarbitrability of the
RICO claim, but by applying Wilko to 1934 Act claims, it refused
to require arbitration of the securities claim." 3 The Supreme
Court reversed, ruling that the entire dispute was arbitrable." 14
First, the Court rejected the argument that section 10(b)
claims can be deduced from the antiwaiver provision of section
29(a) of the 1934 Act, because section 29 does not forbid waiver
of section 27, which grants exclusive jurisdiction of violations of
the 1934 Act to the district courts of the United States.' 15 The
Court reasoned that section 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the
substantive obligations imposed by the 1934 Act and that section
27 is procedural and does not impose statutory duties. 1 6 Thus,
an agreement to arbitrate a future claim merely waives a proce-
dural component of the 1934 Act that gives federal courts juris-
diction. As such, the McMahons' agreement did not waive
compliance with any provision of the 1934 Act in violation of sec-
111. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
112. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 389
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
113. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96-97, 99 (2d
Cir. 1986).
114. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343, 2346.
115. Id. at 2338.
116. Id.
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tion 29(a). 117 Regarding the Second Circuit's reliance on Wilko,
Justice O'Connor deemphasized the Wilko Court's finding that
Congress included an antiwaiver provision in the 1933 Act, which
is similar to section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, to ensure, in part, the
protection of investors' rights by compelling the resolution of any
1934 Act claims in federal court rather than in arbitration pro-
ceedings.118 Instead, she interpreted Wilko as holding that the
waiver of the right to a judicial forum was unenforceable only be-
cause arbitration was judged inadequate to enforce the statutory
rights created by section 12(2).1 19
Second, relying on the holdings in Scherk and Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,120 Justice O'Connor noted
that subsequent Supreme Court decisions had rejected Wilko's
general suspicion of arbitration, recognizing that arbitral tribu-
nals are capable of handling factual and legal complexities,
notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction. 12' Further-
more, arbitration procedures do not entail any consequential re-
striction on substantive rights, and although judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure
that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute. 122 In
addition, Justice O'Connor found that the 1975 amendment to
section 19 of the 1934 Act, which gave the SEC expansive power
to ensure the adequacy of arbitration, indicated that an arbitra-
tion agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections of the
1934 Act. 123
Third, Justice O'Connor rejected the McMahons' argument
based on Congress' affirmation, in the 1975 Conference Report,
of existing case law as established in Wilko. According to the
McMahons, the Report proved Congress knew about and en-
dorsed the lower courts' extension of Wilko to section 10(b)
claims. 124 Justice O'Connor found it inconceivable that "Con-
gress could extend Wilko to the Exchange Act without enacting
into law any provision remotely addressing that subject."' 1 25
Moreover, she reasoned that the Report could support explana-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
121. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2341.
124. Id. at 2342-43.
125. Id. at 2343.
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tions other than those advanced by the McMahons. 126 She con-
cluded that the statement of congressional inaction in effect left
the Wilko issue to the courts.' 27
Thus, the Wilko Court believed that arbitration was ill-suited
to promoting the pro-investor policies of the securities laws.
Wilko focused on the involuntary nature of the agreement, the
lack of legal standards and the absence of a record as well as the
restricted power to vacate an award. The McMahon Court dis-
missed these concerns in light of its assessment of intervening
regulatory development. It determined that sufficient protection
of investors now exists so that pro-investor policies are not jeop-
ardized when balanced against the benefits of arbitration.
In this five-four decision, on the issue of the enforceability of
predispute arbitration agreements under the FAA, the McMahon
dissent disputed the majority's claim that Wilko had been decided
only on the basis of the Court's perception in 1953 of the inade-
quacy of arbitration for the enforcement of section 12(2)
claims.' 28 Justice Blackmun expressed concern about limited ju-
dicial review, nonreliance on judicial precedent and the absence
of a record of the arbitration proceeding. 29 He saw the majority
as abandoning the judiciary's role in the resolution of claims
under the 1934 Act and leaving such claims to the arbitral forum
of the securities industry at a time when the industry's abuses to-
wards investors are more apparent than ever.' 30 He perceived a
need for increased judicial involvement in securities dispute reso-
lution in an era of deregulation when the growth in complaints
parallels the increase in securities violations and suggests a mar-
ket not adequately controlled by Securities Regulatory Organiza-
tions (SROs). 131
In a separate partial dissent, Justice Stevens argued that
long-standing judicial construction of an ambiguous statute gives
the statute a clear meaning, a judicial gloss as it were, alterable
only by the legislature. 32 He concluded that the long-standing
interpretation of Wilko creates a strong presumption that any mis-
takes in the judicial gloss are best remedied by the legislature, not
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2352 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2353-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2358 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2359 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 34: p. 25
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss1/2
ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES
the judiciary. 13 3 If the Court had adopted Justice Stevens' view
that congressional inaction amounts to ratification, it would have
left complex policymaking decisions to a politically accountable
Congress. Justice Stevens would have avoided overruling Con-
gress's acceptance of the Court's understanding of Wilko.' 34
Ironically, in the aftermath of McMahon and the stock market
crash of October 1987, it is now possible that investors increas-
ingly will complain in federal courts about arbitrators who were
partial or acted in manifest disregard of the securities laws. 135
This would lead to a clogging of court calendars, the very pros-
pect which arbitration seeks to avoid. Indeed, in an attempt to
avoid arbitration entirely, investors have continued to seek access
to the federal courts through section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 13 6
III. THE NEED FOR INCREASED FAIRNESS IN ARBITRATION
PROCEDURES IN THE AFTERMATH OF MCMAHON
The post-Wilko assessment of changes in the regulatory su-
pervision of securities organizations will be examined in the fol-
lowing discussion. In part III of the McMahon Court's opinion,
Justice O'Connor called attention to developments in the regula-
tion of the securities industry after the Wilko opinion.' 37 She
noted that these changes called for a new assessment of arbitra-
tion. 138 Changes in the regulatory structure have been spurred in
considerable measure by broader public use of the securities mar-
133. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 280, 285 (1987).
135. Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 658 F. Supp. 576, 579 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (the "partiality" case); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, Smith & Co. v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986) ("manifest disregard" does not
provide a means for wholesale review of awards). Fletcher reports on yet an-
other development, that plaintiffs' lawyers are leaving arbitrable RICO and sec-
tion 10 claims out of their complaints in favor of proceeding in federal court
under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Fletcher, Learning to Live with the Federal
Arbitration Act-Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99,
113 (1988). For a recent example of a court's upholding the nonarbitrability of
section 12(2) claims, seeJohnson v. O'Brien, 420 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
136. The Supreme Court recently agreed to consider whether claims under
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act are arbitrable under predispute broker contracts,
and if so, whether investors are compelled to submit such claims to arbitration
pursuant to the terms of predispute contracts executed before section 12(2)
claims were ruled subject to arbitration. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, (5th Cir.) cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Nov.
14, 1988) (No. 88-385).
137. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
138. See id.
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kets as investment vehicles. 13 9 Broader public investment has
been accompanied by a greater number of disputes between the
public and members of the securities industry.
Increasingly, these disputes are being channeled into arbitra-
tion before forums established by the various SROs, such as the
New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers.' 40 Composite figures of the arbitrations handled by
the arbitration facilities of the various SROs (American, Boston,
Cincinnati, Midwest, New York, Pacific, Philadelphia Stock Ex-
changes, Chicago Board Options, Municipal Securities Rulemak-
ing Board and the National Association of Securities Dealers)
show that the number of public customer cases decided increased
from 410 in 1980 to 622 in 1983.141 Awards in favor of the public
amounted to approximately fifty percent of those handled by the
arbitration tribunals in each of these years. 142 Similarly, the in-
dependent AAA, which provides arbitration services in all fields,
has specially adapted its commercial arbitration rules to securities
disputes, thus giving claimants a choice of either set of rules. As
interest in the impartiality of arbitration grows, more brokerage
house customers may be given the option of selecting an AAA
forum. 143
A. Present Provisions for Securities Arbitration
Since 1975, the SEC has exercised new authority to promote
greater fairness and uniformity in securities arbitration. In 1975,
Congress amended section 19 of the 1934 Act, empowering the
SEC to ensure that arbitration procedures prescribed by the
SROs are adequate to enforce the rights of customers against
brokerage house members of SROs.144
139. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 279.
140. Id. at 280.
141. Id. at 280 n.7.
142. Id.
143. For a description of the AAA Securities Arbitration Rules, see gener-
ally AAA Releases New Arbitration Rules for Customer-Brokerage Firm Disputes, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1392 (1987).
144. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat.
97, 146-54 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1982)). The 1975
amendment of section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 encompassed
many changes. The amendment imposed more stringent requirements on SRO
rule-making. S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 207. Under section 19(b)(1), all SROs must
now file a "concise general statement of the basis and purpose" of any proposed
rule change. Id. Further, under section 19(b)(2), subject to certain exceptions
in section 19(b)(3), "no change in the rules of any self-regulatory organization
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Rules for the administration of securities arbitration disputes
differed among the various SROs before 1976. In that year, the
SEC initiated discussions directed toward developing a uniform
system of grievance procedures for the adjudication of small
claims. As a result of these discussions and recommendations
from several SROs, a Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion (SICA), consisting of representatives of various SROs, the
Securities Industry Association and the public, was established in
April 1977.145 SICA developed a simplified arbitration procedure
for resolving small claims of $2,500 or less.146 SICA then devel-
oped a comprehensive Uniform Code of Arbitration (UCA) for
the securities industry and prepared an explanatory booklet for
prospective claimants.' 47 The UCA was adopted by participating
SROs during 1979 and 1980.148
The UCA establishes a uniform system of arbitration be-
tween customers and members of the securities industry for
claims submitted pursuant to a written agreement or upon de-
mand by the customer. 149 The SROs have reserved the right to
restrict the use of arbitration facilities to the resolution of dis-
putes relating to the activities of the broker-dealers. 50 In addi-
tion, disputes must be submitted for arbitration within six years of
the date of the event giving rise to the controversy.' 5 '
The UCA provides that an arbitration panel consists of at
least three, but not more than five, impartial arbitrators, with a
majority from outside the securities industry unless the customer
requests a majority from the industry. 52 The Director of Arbitra-
tion of the SRO determines who serves on a particular arbitration
may become effective until the SEC finds it to be consistent with the registration
requirements for the organization and the purposes of the Exchange Act." Id. at
30, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 208.
In addition, the amendment of section 19 added to the SEC's power to
change the rules of SROs. Id. at 31, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
209. Specifically, under section 19(c), the SEC now has authority to "abrogate,
add to, or delete from" any SRO's rules in any respect consistent with the objec-
tives of the Exchange Act. Id.. Moreover, where the SEC has changed an SRO
rule pursuant to its section 19(c) authority, any other SRO rule inconsistent with
the SEC amended rule is null and void. Id.
145. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 283-84.
146. Id. at 284.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 285.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Rules 600-634, 2 N.Y.S.E.
Guide (CCH) 2600-2634 (1987).
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panel. 153 Furthermore, the Director is to inform the parties of the
names and business affiliations of arbitrators before the date fixed
for the initial hearing. 154
Each party has the right to one peremptory challenge. 55 If
there are multiple claimants, respondents and/or third-party re-
spondents, the claimants have one peremptory challenge, and the
respondents and third-party respondents have one peremptory
challenge, unless the Director of Arbitration determines that the
interests of justice would best be served by awarding additional
peremptory challenges. 56 Moreover, to enable the parties to
make an informed choice of neutral arbitrators, the arbitrators are
affirmatively obliged to disclose "any circumstances which might
preclude such an arbitrator from rendering an objective and im-
partial determination."'157 The materiality and relevance of evi-
dence under the UCA is left to the discretion of the arbitrators
who are not bound by rules governing the admissibility of evi-
dence. 158 All parties have the right to representation by counsel
at any stage of the proceedings.' 59 The UCA does not require the
SROs to keep a record of the arbitration. If a record is kept, it
must be a verbatim record. If a party requests a record of the
proceedings, it must bear the cost of transcription. 60
The UCA provides arbitrators and counsel with the full legal
subpoena power.' 6 ' However, it encourages the parties to pro-
duce witnesses and present proofs to the fullest extent possible
without resort to the subpoena process. 62 The UCA further pro-
vides that arbitrators can compel the appearance of any employee
or associate of any member or member organization of the SRO
conducting the arbitration, and/or the production of any records
in the possession or control of such persons, members or mem-
ber organizations. 63 Rule 619 also provides that the parties must
cooperate in the voluntary exchange of documents and informa-
tion as will serve to expedite the arbitration. 64 On the other
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2607-2608.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2610.
157. Id. at 2621.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2614.
160. Id. at 2624.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2619.
163. Id. at 2620.
164. Id.
[Vol. 34: p. 25
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss1/2
ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES
hand, extensive pretrial discovery procedures, such as bills of par-
ticulars, interrogatories, depositions and notices to produce doc-
uments for inspection are not available in arbitration
proceedings. 65 Even though the lack of discovery may be fatal to
a claimant's case, the policy of limited discovery is supported by
the rationale that arbitration is designed to achieve an economi-
cal, expeditious and fair result. Nevertheless, it is undisputable
that the broker has the fullest information, including the cus-
tomer's file. The major advantages of arbitration are contain-
ment of costs and avoidance of delay. 166
Provisions for pleadings and amendments are set out in the
UCA.1 67 Proceedings are initiated by filing three executed copies
of both the Submission Agreement and the Statement of Claim of
the controversy in dispute.' 68 The Statement of Claim should
specify the relevant facts and the remedies sought. 16 9 A respon-
dent has twenty business days from receipt of service to submit an
executed copy of the respondent's answer which must specify all
available defenses to the Statement of Claim as well as the rele-
vant facts that will be relied upon at the hearing. 170 A respon-
dent, cross-claimant or other adversary who answers only with a
general denial that fails to specify all available defenses and rele-
vant facts may be barred from presenting any facts or defenses at
the hearing if an adversarial party objects in writing to the Direc-
tor of Arbitration. 17' Arbitration may take about one year. 172
The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is very
limited.' 73 "If the award is within the submission, and contains
the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing
of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error,
either in law or fact."' 74 The grounds for vacating an arbitration
award are fairly restricted. 175 Unless the law directs otherwise, all
awards rendered pursuant to the UCA are deemed final and not
165. Id.
166. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 287 n.52.
167. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2612, 2626 (1987).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Schiffers & Goldwasser, supra note 2, at 68.
173. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 9, at 756-57; see, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz,
Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972).
174. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 290 (quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S.
344, 349 (1854)).
175. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2628 (1987).
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subject to review or appeal.' 7 6
SICA considered broadening the scope of review of a securi-
ties arbitration award but rejected the notion as being inconsis-
tent with the objectives of simplicity, brevity and economy in
arbitration proceedings. 7 7 Broadening the scope of arbitration
review would require increased costs and more detailed
records. 178 Moreover, broader review would hinder speedy reso-
lution of the dispute because collection of the award would be
deferred pending the appeal.' 79
B. Current Suggestions for Improvement of Securities Arbitration
It is as yet too early to tell whether the McMahon Court's esti-
mate of arbitration procedures will promote the desired ends of
reducing litigation of securities disputes and achieving quick, effi-
cient and economic resolution of claims by arbitration. Desirable
as these goals are, the inadequacies of supervisory procedures in
several areas of regulation militate against the presumption that
the public will perceive arbitration procedures as fair in fact and
appearance. In an era of deregulation, it is clear that the McMa-
hon decision was launched on a sea of euphoria, a navigable cur-
rent of which was the assessment of the improved condition of
arbitration in securities disputes. That reassuring perception of
arbitration facilities was invoked by Justice O'Connor as a basis
for her declaration of the diminished importance of Wilko.
Justice O'Connor based her conclusion on her interpretation
of Wilko as a judicial decision that the arbitration process in 1953
was "inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by section
12(2)."180 In addition, she found that the 1975 Amendment to
section 19 of the 1934 Act, which gave the SEC expansive power
to ensure the adequacy of arbitration procedures, was an indica-
tion that an arbitration agreement does not affect a waiver of the
protection of that Act.' 8 ' Justice O'Connor summed up the 1975
amendments to section 19 as giving the SEC "broad authority to
oversee and to regulate the rules adopted by the SROs relating to
customer disputes, including the power to mandate the adoption
of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration proce-
176. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 291 n.84.
177. Id. at 291.
178. Id. at 291 n.84.
179. Id.
180. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
181. Id. at 2341.
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dures adequately protect statutory rights."' 82
To date, it is questionable whether the public derives the
same assurance of the adequacy of arbitration procedures from
the 1975 amendments to section 19 as does Justice O'Connor.
More likely, the investor has the impression, often justified, that
his claims are being judged by a forum composed of individuals
sympathetic to the securities industry and not drawn from the
public. Not infrequently, public arbitrators are attorneys or con-
sultants whose clients have been exchange members or SROs.' 8 3
Investor opposition to and industry support for the process indi-
cate a likelihood that the securities industry has an advantage in a
forum under its own control. "The houses basically like the pres-
ent system because they own the stacked deck."' 84 Moreover, the
SEC does not assert that its oversight consists of anything more
than a general review of SRO rules; its authority does not purport
to include a review of specific arbitration proceedings. 185
With respect to the SEC's general overview of SRO rules, it
should be noted that the SEC in recent years has increasingly in-
voked section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act.'8 6 That section autho-
rizes the SEC to impose sanctions on broker-dealers and their
employees who have failed reasonably to supervise employees
with a view to preventing violations of the securities laws.187 The
clearly growing concern on the part of the SEC over compliance
violations in the industry indicates that the industry's self-regula-
tion is not functioning optimally.' 88 For example, self-regulation
has not provided branch managers with training in personnel
guidelines with respect to inquiries into suspect trading, adopting
sanctions for those who obstruct compliance and developing pro-
cedures to enforce trading restrictions. 89 Nor has self-regulation
provided enforcement mechanisms in the compliance depart-
ments of brokerage houses to deal with repeated violations. 190
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2355 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. Times, Mar. 29,
1987, § 3, at 8, col. 1 (statement of Sheldon H. Eisen, Chairman, ABA Task
Force on Securities Arbitration)).
185. Id. at 2357.
186. Ferrara & Shapiro, SEC Imposes Sanctions for Failure of Firms to Supervise
Its Employees, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 7, 1987, at 35.
187. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4)(E) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
188. Ferrara & Shapiro, supra note 186, at 35.
189. Id. at 44.
190. Id. at 35.
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The SEC has identified the following areas of regulation as
often lacking adequate supervisory procedures:
(i) failure to supervise customer accounts ade-
quately, particularly option accounts, for unsuitable, un-
authorized and excessive trading (churning) in customer
accounts;
(ii) failure to detect or investigate reasons for
heavy trading in nonrecommended securities and securi-
ties in which account executives are affiliated with the
issues;
(iii) lax or sloppy procedures in fund and securi-
ties transfers and disbursements;
(iv) failure to file required government currency
transaction reports on all currency transactions (depos-
its, withdrawals, exchange or transfers involving a physi-
cal transfer in currency) in excess of $10,000;
(v) illegal profits, including certain transactions in
which broker-dealers take overly large profits. 19 1
Such failures have resulted in a growth in complaints about
the securities industry, many of which find their way to arbitra-
tion. The increase in securities violations suggests a market not
adequately controlled by the SROs. 192 In addition, there have
been complaints that arbitration procedures are rife with conflicts
of interest (since arbitrators are peers of the brokerage firms be-
ing sued) and are inadequate to enforce statutory rights of cus-
tomers against broker-dealers. 193 Indeed, at the same time the
Court was considering McMahon, the House of Representatives
received a report on the failure of SROs to handle customer-bro-
ker disputes properly.194
More specifically, under its section 19 authority, the SEC has
been suggesting several improvements to the present provision
for arbitration. In general, most of the suggestions for improving
191. Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
192. Id. According to Representative J. Dingell, even the SEC's ability to
control the market is questionable. SEC and Insider Trading: Hearings on H.R. 99-
179 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (Dec. 11, 1986).
193. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2358 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIR-
MAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND Fi-
NANCE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, H.R., SECURITIES REGULATION
GAO/GGD-86-89 (Sept. 30, 1986).
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the process derive from the FAA itself, the AAA's securities arbi-
tration rules (which give investors more safeguards) and the pro-
cedural protections of litigation. Moreover, the suggestions take
into account the statutory policies of the FAA as well as those of
the federal securities laws which were enacted to protect ill-in-
formed investors from sophisticated brokers. 195
The first proposal for improving the tenor and quality of se-
curities arbitration would require that investors be able to elect
between arbitration and litigation. Investors are often required
to sign an agreement to arbitrate future disputes as a condition to
opening an account with a broker. At the time, however, they do
not focus on the arbitration clause. The brokerage agreement is
usually a standard form in fine print with technical language. 96
The standard arbitration clause authorizes the customer to elect
the arbitration forum from a list of several organizations, some-
times including the AAA. If the customer does not select the fo-
rum within the five days after receipt from the broker-dealer of a
notification requesting an election, the broker-dealer becomes au-
thorized to make the election. 197
What would make the hypothetical reasonable customer vol-
untarily enter into an arbitration agreement, other than the assur-
ance of getting a fair deal? This is a large question, which
perhaps starts with the least likely assumption first; that the agree-
ment is indeed voluntary. The most important power not in-
cluded in the SEC's "broad authority" set forth in the 1975
amendments to the 1934 Act gives rise to this threshold issue.
Wilko provided judicial protection against mandatory arbitration,
and the SEC has no authority to require the brokerage houses to
give their customers a choice between litigation and arbitration in
the event that a dispute later arises between them. 198 Neverthe-
195. Stansbury & Klein, The Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes: A Summary
of Developments, 35 ARB. J., Sept. 1980 at 30, 37.
196. Id.
197. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 292 n.86.
198. Schotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 527 (D. Md. 1986) (SEC has "no
authority to enlarge or restrict forums legally available to a litigant or to invali-
date arbitration clauses that are enforceable under the Act."); Jope v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 632 F. Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (SEC release stating "cus-
tomers should be made aware prior to signing an agreement containing an arbi-
tration clause that such a prior agreement does not bar a cause of action under
the federal securities laws" assumes claims under 1934 Act are nonarbitrable
and merely interpretive statement by SEC staff and does not have force of law).
Before 1975, the SEC had no authority over arbitration procedures. Brief for
the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
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less, having such a choice may turn out to be very important in
the public perception of the fairness of securities arbitration.
Two routes are open to provide the customers of brokerage
houses this free choice. First, the SROs may on their own author-
ity simply decide to amend their code, or, second, free choice may
become the subject of congressional attention. For example, be-
cause it was clear that Wilko did not extend to commodities inves-
tors, Congress mandated that commodities investors make their
own choice between arbitration and litigation.1 99 The commodi-
ties investor who does not want to sign a predispute arbitration
clause is not foreclosed from doing business with the commodi-
ties broker. Congressional protection for the commodities inves-
tor includes separate disclosure of the clause.200  The
commodities broker simply points out the arbitration clause, ex-
plains it and mentions that if the customer wants this feature, a
line below the clause is provided for the customer's signature.20'
While the customer frequently elects arbitration, acceptance is
not a condition of doing business. Thus, Congress proved willing
to encourage arbitration of commodities disputes but would not
mandate arbitration in the absence of the investor's specific, in-
formed consent. These elements of voluntariness, the customer's
election of arbitration, the broker's pointing out and calling at-
tention to the arbitration clause and the separate signature line
for predispute acceptance of arbitration, may prove adaptable to
investors' contracts with securities brokers. With Wilko's protec-
tions removed from customer-broker disputes under section 10,
Congress may provide statutory relief.
As it stands now, it may be that few securities brokerage cus-
tomers are even aware of the arbitration clause at the time they
sign their contracts, and even fewer may focus on the possibility
of a future dispute with their brokers. One clear policy of the
securities laws is to protect ill-informed investors.202 Its protec-
tion may reasonably be extended to disclosure of predispute arbi-
tration clauses. No statistics are available to indicate whether
customers are precluded from investing with a brokerage house if
199. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982); Comment, Predis-
pute Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Arising under the Commodity Exchange Act, 42 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 939, 956-59 (1985).
200. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(l 1) (1982) (use of arbi-
tration procedure by a commodities customer must be voluntary).
201. Id.
202. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 9, at 754.
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they refuse arbitration. 20 3 Even the SEC's former espousal of a
rule which prohibited brokers from binding customers to arbitra-
tion is equivocal evidence of preclusion. 20 4 Before McMahon, the
most common arbitration provisions were thought to be in op-
tions and margin contracts and commodities accounts.20 5 Given
the Court's approbation of predispute arbitration clauses in Mc-
Mahon, the prevalence of arbitration clauses can only increase in
cash accounts.
Even though the individual customer may not be subjectively
aware of giving up the opportunity to choose litigation in a future
dispute with the brokerage house, he may later become distrustful
of brokers and the securities markets in general upon discovery of
the waiver, usually after a dispute has arisen. Thus, the assurance
of a voluntary selection of arbitration may also serve a symbolic
function. 20 6 While the broker's disclosure about the availability
and advantages of arbitration may elicit factual, subjective assent
to arbitration and insure the investor's cooperation, voluntariness
may also serve a public, objective role. Assuring investors that
they are not precluded from litigation as a condition of doing
business with their brokers underlines the importance of their
own choices as informed investors.
Accordingly, as a means of enhancing investor confidence in
the efficacy of the arbitration process, the first proposal of inves-
tor election of arbitration is to establish a formal basis for ensur-
ing fairness of arbitration procedures. This proposal is
concerned with measures for increasing public confidence in arbi-
tration procedures and is directed to confirming the voluntariness
and impartiality of the agreement. The proposal is designed to
increase public confidence that arbitration procedures are fair in
fact and appearance. "lJ]ustice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."20 7 In
his statement before the SEC, as long ago as December 8, 1978,
Professor Katsoris, a member of SICA, public arbitrator at the
New York Stock Exchange and arbitrator for the First Judicial De-
partment in New York, remarked: "To insure ... public invest-
ment we must retain the public's confidence-confidence in the
markets themselves and confidence that should a dispute arise, it
203. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 292 n.86.
204. Id. at 297.
205. Id. at 292 n.86; see also Stansbury & Klein, supra note 195, at 32.
206. Cf McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1319-20 (1982).
207. Katsoris, supra note 46, at 309-10.
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will be fairly resolved. This confidence, however, can only be
earned by maintaining a defacto as well as a dejure image of fair-
ness." 208 The de facto image of fairness can be promoted by re-
moving any appearances of adhesion contracts. A contract of
adhesion arises when a party with superior bargaining power
presents a standardized form contract to a party of lesser bargain-
ing power whose choice is limited to accepting or rejecting the
contract without the opportunity to negotiate. 20 9 While it is true
that mere inequality in bargaining power does not make a con-
tract unenforceable, nonetheless, when the arbitration agreement
is presented as a precondition to opening an account, the image
of de facto fairness is seriously compromised. Therefore, it
should be clear to the investor that the agreement is entirely
optional.
The second proposal is concerned with the form of arbitra-
tion, and is directed to correcting its deficiencies by bringing to
arbitration some of the procedural advantages of adjudication, in-
cluding the appearance of impartiality, which in that system is as-
sured by the presence of the judge. In arbitration, impartiality
may be achieved by removing the presumptive institutional bias
of the arbitration panel. Members of arbitration panels are often
affiliated with the self-regulatory exchanges and are "frequently
the targets of the antifraud provisions they are asked to inter-
pret." 2 10 In disputes involving amounts over $2,500, an ag-
grieved investor has a right to a panel whose majority is from
outside the industry. 211 These "outside" individuals are often
either attorneys who represent brokers, or employees of busi-
nesses that are outside the securities field but that nevertheless
are associated with a business that is a part of the securities indus-
try. 21 2 The conflicts of interest are more obvious in some cases
than in others. The line determining who is "not from the indus-
try" concededly is hard to draw. Panel members should be famil-
iar with the securities industry, but it is clear that application of
any proposed classification by SICA requires vigilance and over-
sight which may not be forthcoming from the SROs.
Again, two routes are available to insure a fair, impartial fo-
rum and to eliminate perceived industry bias. One route would
208. Id. at 313.
209. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 445.
210. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 9, at 755.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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be to provide the customer with the choice of an independent fo-
rum such as the AAA. The other is to improve the impartiality of
the arbitration services the SROs provide by amending the rules
in the UCA. In the fall of 1987, the SEC's Division of Market
Regulation made several recommendations to SICA pursuant to
its section 19 authority.2 13 For example, the SEC proposals call
for both greater disclosure and substantive changes on such is-
sues as who may serve as a public arbitrator.2 1 4 Currently, SICA
does not restrict lawyers with ties to the securities industry from
serving as public arbitrators. The AAA has an informal five-year
exclusion of people who "directly or indirectly" act as "counsel-
ors, consultants, advisors or attorneys" to an SRO or SRO-affili-
ate from serving as public arbitrators.2i5 The SEC would go
further by banning securities industry retirees from service as
public arbitrators, and reclassifying them to serve in industry
slots. 21 6 In addition, the SEC would cut professionals with a cer-
tain amount of securities industry business from the public list.217
Some SROs have expressed willingness to create a public percep-
tion of impartiality. 21 8 Along the same lines, greater disclosure of
the backgrounds of the arbitrators on the list would aid custom-
ers' selections and use of their peremptory challenges. Similarly,
written evaluations of arbitrators by the parties and their counsel
could be collected and their substance disclosed for use in future
selections. Brokerage houses that regularly use arbitration rou-
tinely accumulate this information, thus giving rise to a disparity
of information between brokers and customers.
This second cluster of proposals would further modify the
form of arbitration by incorporating additional procedural advan-
tages of adjudication. Techniques learned from judicial supervi-
sion of litigation could be made available to resolve questions of
substantive law219 or for special difficulties such as abuse of dis-
213. Franklin, supra note 97, at 5. For another report on the SEC's recom-
mendations, see SEC Staff to Urge Revisions to Industry Arbitration System, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1387 (1987).
214. Franklin, supra note 97, at 5.
215. Friedman, AAA's New Securities Arbitration Rules, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8,
1987, at 5.
216. Franklin, supra note 97, at 5.
217. Id.
218. Id. Edward Morris, Director of Arbitration at the New York Stock Ex-
change, has acknowledged that the exchange wants to avoid the appearance of
partiality and pro-industry bias. Id.
219. See Brunet, supra note 104, at 14 (pointing out that the many arbitra-
tions that end without a written opinion leave substantive basis for such deci-
sions in doubt).
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covery, without resorting to full-blown adjudication. 220 A process
that takes into account protection of the investor sends a signal to
the community that the substantive law is worthy of enforce-
ment.221 Application of clear legal standards strengthens the im-
age of impartiality and provides a measure by which disputants
can assess the neutrality of those who decide or facilitate the deci-
sion in a dispute.222 Although the SEC has proposed that securi-
ties arbitrators be educated in substantive law, SICA would rather
leave counsel to brief the arbitrators on the legal issues than make
provision for their nonlawyer arbitrators to learn securities
law. 223
The factfinding function of dispute resolution cannot work
properly without mechanisms to compel disclosure of facts. 224
While some form of discovery is available to the injured investor
through subpoena, most other forms are excluded. 225 The lack of
meaningful discovery in arbitration puts the investor at a severe
disadvantage, because he may not be able to learn the true facts
surrounding the alleged mishandling of his account. Without suf-
ficient discovery, an investor may not be able to determine, for
example, the volume of commissions generated by his accounts
or the existence of any conflicts of interest. Since brokers usually
have more information about the controversy than investors, the
lack of sufficient discovery affects investors more than brokers. 226
Provision for discovery within the arbitration process could per-
mit equal access to information and at the same time curtail at-
tempts to use discovery as a test of delay or harassment. SICA is
considering providing for exchange of documents before the
hearing date, if the arbitration panel requests it. Presently, the
UCA does not require documents to be turned over, and subpoe-
naed documents must only be produced at the outset of the hear-
ing. 22 7 Expanded use of discovery could help to resolve disputes
before the hearing. Again, the AAA already permits hearings at
preliminary stages in complex cases and provides for the record-
220. See id. at 13 (arbitration lacks formal sanctions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37 for abuse of discovery).
221. See id. at 17 (noting that risk in resolving a federal securities law dis-
pute through alternative dispute resolution methods is that parties may be able
to avoid impact of policies underlying substantive law).
222. Franklin, supra note 97, at 6.
223. Id.
224. Brunet, supra note 104, at 34.
225. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 9, at 756.
226. Id.
227. Franklin, supra note 97, at 6.
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ing of hearings at a party's request. 228
The SEC has also called for more detailed public information
about the nature of the awards, if not for publication of the record
of proceedings and explanation of the decision and reasons there-
fore.229 Without such. reports, meaningful judicial review of arbi-
tration decisions is foreclosed by the absence of a record. An
arbitration decision may be overturned when it is in "manifest
disregard" of the law, but it is almost impossible to determine
whether such disregard has occurred when the basis for the award
is undisclosed. 230 As yet, there is little industry acceptance of
these suggestions. Thus, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board, a SICA member, resists detailing awards. Intimidation of
nonlawyer arbitrators unfamiliar with the law and possible evi-
dence of manifest disregard of the law in a written award are the
major grounds for the Board's opposition.2 31
In sum, when cases involve issues of public interest, such as
securities, the identity of the judge or decision facilitator is criti-
cal. Disputes important to the public require decisions by credi-
ble figures who are competent referees selected by an open
process involving the public-the usual means of selecting
judges. 232 Arbitration could also be improved by fairness in dis-
covery, record maintenance and appeal. These features offer the
distinct advantages of neutral analysis of the case, equal access to
discovery and application of clear legal standards as a basis for
the findings.
The clear danger is that we might be replicating in arbitra-
tion some of the slower and costlier provisions of litigation. The
SROs roundly reject the specter of losing their speed and infor-
mality. On the other side, arbitration reformers are not per-
suaded that even the acceptance of all of these suggestions would
provide investors with sufficient protection. 233 The measures
proposed here steer a middle course and would restore public
confidence in the securities arbitration process offered by SROs.
These measures might impede to a minor degree the speed and
procedural efficiency of arbitration. In the long run, however, in-
creased investor confidence in the merits of arbitration should
228. Friedman, supra note 215, at 5.
229. Franklin, supra note 97, at 6.
230. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 9, at 757.
231. Franklin, supra note 97, at 6.
232. Brunet, supra note 104, at 44.
233. Franklin, supra note 97, at 6.
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weigh favorably against minor delays occasioned by more vigilant
oversight of the process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arbitration ushers in concepts of minimalism for the settle-
ment of disputes, and appeals to the current desire for more im-
mediate, if not instant, results. On the other hand, modern
discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, repre-
senting both the best and worst aspects of trial without surprise,
works hand-in-hand with the Federal Rules of Evidence to pro-
vide an extremely rational method of dispute resolution. Before
such uniform rules of evidence and the even more recent empha-
sis on discovery, trials themselves were less information oriented.
In early trials, even judicial authority figures played a more re-
stricted role, helping the parties plead the issues but leaving the
outcome to the inscrutable jury, which sometimes rendered ver-
dicts beyond the apparent reach of reason, like the ancient or-
deals and trials by battles. 23 4
Arbitration harks back to a much less heavily rational solu-
tion to disputes than the present-day trial. Although informality
has replaced ancient ritual, certainty, speed and low cost charac-
terize both ancient modes of proof and modern arbitration.
While arbitration may only replicate in a different forum the his-
tory of the growth of trials from the ritualism of battle to the ra-
tionalism of a full-blown trial in a federal court, it may be that the
widespread use of arbitration will prove as great a watershed as
the rise of equity. Equity provided such innovative remedies as
specific performance and injunctions, which the law later proved
able to incorporate successfully. Eventually, new accommoda-
tions may be reached through the tension in our justice system
produced by the rationalism of trials and the informality of
arbitration.
For the immediate future, in the area of securities disputes,
steering a middle course which incorporates some of the basic
protections of the judicial system but which eschews massive dis-
covery, rules of evidence and routine appeals will ensure the re-
sponsiveness of arbitration to the needs of investors, the
securities industry and the general public. Even without innova-
tive developments, such a fair and workable securities arbitration
234. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 5, 63, 67-71
(2d ed. 1979).
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system would achieve no small success through public
acceptance.
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